This article was first published by Daily Friend on 25 July 2024
South Africa went from having the strongest opposition formation of its history, to having no real opposition whatsoever, in the span of days. Say what you will about the new super-coalition governing the country: a strong opposition remains necessary for a healthy democracy.
Accidental one-party state
In a recent video about the absurdities of the first-past-the-post electoral system, the vlogger explained that, hypothetically, a fear of extreme right-wing or left-wing parties might lead a diverse array of parties in an otherwise competitive democratic system to ‘stand down’ to other ‘less bad’ parties in certain constituencies, just to ensure the extremists do not win the election. If they do not stand down, they risk splitting the vote.
This could, in theory, result in one party – that is not one of the extremist parties – winning every single seat in parliament. The fear of radicalism or extremism, usually associated with a party taking power and installing a dictatorship of a sort, could, then, actually lead to the (accidental) creation of a one-party state.
While South Africa, thankfully, does not subscribe to the first-past-the-post system, there is something analogous about ‘standing down’ to ‘less bad’ parties in electoral constituencies to keep extremists out, and forming a coalition with a ‘less bad’ party to keep extremists out.
Coalitions are par for the course in proportional representation systems, and I submit that coalition politics is a good thing. But what happened with the formation of the ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU) super-coalition in South Africa is not conducive to a multi-party democracy that requires a strong opposition.
After the 29 May election, and the announcement of the GNU thereafter, South Africa today has only 11 opposition members of Parliament out of 400. These are the representatives of ActionSA (ASA), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), and Build One South Africa (BOSA).
The rest are either in government or are so closely aligned with the African National Congress (ANC) ideologically – the so-called ‘Progressive Caucus’ – that they might as well be in government.
The latter’s policy preferences, in other words, are on the table with the ANC anyway, even if the parties themselves are not ‘in’ government. The ANC and the Progressive Caucus parties are enemies for all the wrong reasons – personality clashes, disputes about access to patronage – but very close friends on matters of ideology and, in particular, bad ideas.
Role of the opposition
In the days following the election, the Free Market Foundation (FMF) warned that it was crucial for South Africa to retain a strong opposition. No democracy can function without it, and a unified government – while it can theoretically do much good, can also do much evil – should be avoided.
Neither the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) or uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), the Progressive Caucus’s anchor tenants, can be described as ‘opposition’ in any real sense. MK is made up of disgruntled former ANC members who are all primarily dedicated to ensuring Jacob Zuma does not go to prison, and the EFF is the ANC Youth League-in-exile waiting for an opportune moment to ‘come home.’
Neither of these parties have ever, or will ever, do the real work of opposition: asking the necessary questions in Parliament that go beyond race-hustling, providing impetus to anti-state corruption initiatives, and exposing threats to the civil liberty of the people. Where the GNU threatens civil liberty – by adopting hate speech or property confiscation legislation, for example – the Progressive Caucus is very likely to support it in that endeavour.
The historic opportunity that the ANC’s sub-50% performance gave South Africa – for Parliament to hold the party and its deployees accountable for the first time in 30 years – was short-lived. The ANC spent only a few days as a 41%-party, but then contrived for itself, through co-option, a massive 72% majority with the formation of the GNU.
With 389 members of Parliament being part of the GNU (287) or ANC-adjacent (102), South Africa has democratically wound up in a one-party state situation. And it was exclusively, it seems, fear of the violent extremism of the Progressive Caucus that caused the formerly large opposition to decide to avail itself for co-option.
A ‘one-coalition’ state is not necessarily much better than a ‘one-party’ state, as the erstwhile National Front in East Germany and the so-called Unified Front in modern Communist China shows.
If one party in the coalition is, effectively, ‘in charge,’ then the coalition and the party are substantively indistinguishable. The GNU is an ANC coalition, and if one feels less charitable, one might call it an ANC ‘front.’
This is not to say that the GNU is useless: keeping up appearances might be important enough to the ANC that the GNU does have a moderating effect on public policy, and this could be a good thing for all South Africans. But we should not delude ourselves into believing that the GNU is not a contrivance the ANC used to nullify its electoral loss and ensure it retained effective majoritarian control of the levers of power.
Government holding itself accountable?
The former opposition, primarily embodied in the Democratic Alliance (DA), claims, of course, that they will endeavour to ensure accountability from within government.
One can give them the benefit of the doubt and assume that they will try hard to achieve this. But the reality that cannot be avoided is this: they are all in one coalition right now, and in the words of John Steenhuisen himself, the DA will not vote to support a motion of no confidence in Cyril Ramaphosa because the ANC is a better devil than MK or the EFF.
This will be the calculation in every notable case of corruption within government.
The DA will know that, ultimately, the ANC will not allow a snowball effect to occur where accountability for corruption is addressed. Accountability will only be possible in cases where the DA, the ANC, and other GNU partners agree to pursue the allegedly corrupt. These will necessarily tend not to involve the leadership of the ANC’s current controlling bloc.
Of course, this is how coalitions work. Even if the DA offered confidence and supply to the ANC, as the FMF recommended it should, it would not have been able to vote the ANC (minority) government out in a no confidence vote. Coalitions are meant to stick together, which means it is important for there to be a strong opposition outside the coalition to help spur accountability.
Extremism
There are worse things to be afraid of than extremism. Politically, liberalism means reducing the temperature of politics by taking as much ‘off the table’ as possible and ensuring that the stakes are (relatively) low. Extremism, whether of left- or right-wing variety, then, is all about increasing the temperature and stakes of politics by putting not only more ‘on the table,’ but finding society’s most significant wedge issues and putting them on the table.
But the fear of extremism must be rational and it must be calculated.
Having now had time to understand what happened in the backrooms where the GNU was negotiated, it seems that the only ones who acted in a calculated fashion were the ANC. The rest had some ‘conditions’ which were summarily dismissed, but it all eventually came down to this: we need to keep the Progressive Caucus out, even at the risk of being co-opted ourselves.
Perhaps this is all worth it. If the GNU can stick together and be politically moderate (I have significant doubts about that) for the full five-year term, South Africa might just be better for it.
But, when viewed from a limited government perspective, this is not something to celebrate.
If the DA, Inkatha Freedom Party, or Freedom Front Plus does not soon leave the GNU to take the reins of political opposition alongside ASA, the ACDP, and BOSA, the next five years need to be at least partly dedicated to establishing a new political force in South Africa that would be ready to become the opposition in 2029.